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PROFITS AND PROFESSIONALISM 
Deborah Rhode* 
“Ethics pays” is a recurring refrain among commentators on professional 
and business ethics.  This should come as no surprise.  In a culture 
preoccupied with profit, appeals to self- interest may be the most 
persuasive strategy.  Yet if virtue were always its own reward, we would 
surely see more of it.  Promoting ethical values in professional workplaces 
that are increasingly focused on the bottom line will require pushing 
beyond the platitudes.  We need more probing analysis of key questions.  
To what extent does ethics pay?  How well?  Under what circumstances?  
And most important, what can be done to increase the rate of return? 
The following discussion explores those questions in three contexts.  
The first involves workplace cultures.  How do we create more 
organizational structures in which adhering to principles serves prudential 
interests?  A second area of inquiry involves pro bono service.  If, as 
research suggests, lawyers do well by doing good, how can we 
communicate that message more effectively in work and educational 
settings?  A third cluster of issues concern quality of life.  If, as a wide 
array of studies indicate, balanced lives promote bottom lines, what will 
convince more legal employers to adjust their policies accordingly? 
I.  DOES ETHICS PAY?  WORKPLACE CULTURES AND PROFESSIONAL 
VALUES 
A widespread concern within the American bar is the perceived “decline 
of the profession into a business.”  About three quarters of surveyed 
lawyers believe that the profession has become more “money conscious,” 
and few regard the change as welcome.1
 
* Ernest W. McFarland Professor of Law, Director of the Center on Ethics, Stanford 
University.  B.A., J.D. Yale University. 
  The prevailing assumption is that 
the priority on short-term profits undermines moral values and social 
 1. Wes Hanson, Lawyers, Lawyers, Lawyers, Ethics: Easier Said Than Done, 
JOSEPHSON INST. NEWSLETTER (Josephson Instit., Los Angeles, California), 1993, at 38; 
Chris Klein, Big Firm Partners: Profession Sinking, NAT’L L.J., May 26, 1997, at A1 
(eighty-two percent of surveyed large firm partners believed that the profession has changed 
for the worse). 
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responsibilities.2  Growing financial pressures make it increasingly difficult 
for lawyers to antagonize clients or supervisors by delivering unhappy 
messages about what legal rules and legal ethics require.  Greed may not be 
the root of all evil, but it is surely responsible for much of the bar’s 
complicity in financial, environmental, and health and safety disasters.3
Yet while most commentary on legal ethics laments the bar’s 
capitulation to market values, most commentary on business ethics insists 
that those values, if properly assessed, are part of the solution, not the 
problem.  From this perspective, where individuals and institutions go 
wrong is in focusing on short-term financial gains, which come at the 
expense of larger long- term costs.  The legal and reputational 
consequences of moral myopia often dwarf any immediate payoffs.  Recent 
work on moral leadership, particularly trade publications written by and for 
managers, is peppered with reassuring homilies.  If Aristotle Ran GM offers 
a representative sample: a “climate of goodness . . . will always pay great 
dividends,” “you can’t put a simple price on trust,” “unethical conduct 
is . . . self-defeating or even self-destructive over the long run.”
 
4  A 
dispassionate review of global business practices might suggest that 
Aristotle would need to be running more than General Motors for this all to 
be true.  But no matter; in most of this commentary, a few spectacularly 
expensive examples of moral meltdowns will do. Companies make “billion 
dollar errors in judgment” by marketing unsafe products, fiddling with the 
numbers in securities filings, or failing to report or discipline rogue 
employees.5  The moral of the story is always that if “values are lost, 
everything is lost.”6
Even more hardheaded leadership advice is often tempered with at least 
lip service to the cost effectiveness of integrity and reminders that profits 
are not an end in themselves.  In their best selling book, In Search of 
 
 
 2. See sources cited in DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 9, 216-17 
n.18-19 (2000); ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993). 
 3. For example, see RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 7-10; David 
Luban, Making Sense of Moral Meltdowns, Address at the Stanford Center on Ethics (Apr. 
2004). 
 4. TOM MORRIS, IF ARISTOTLE RAN GENERAL MOTORS: THE NEW SOUL OF BUSINESS 
127, 134, 157 (1997). 
 5. The error in judgment is a phrase applied to Salomon Brothers’ mishandling of a 
trader who submitted false bids.  For a thoughtful discussion, see LYNN SHARP PAINE, 
VALUE SHIFT 9-12 (2003).  Other commonly cited examples include fraud by Enron, Tyco, 
and unsafe products by Johns Manville (asbestos) and H.R. Robbins (Dalkon Shields).  See 
Saul W. Gellerman, Why Good Managers Make Bad Ethical Choices, HARV. BUS. REV., 
July-Aug. 1986, at 85; JOHN DALLA COSTA, ETHICAL IMPERATIVE 241-43 (1998). 
 6. NOEL M. TICHY & ANDREW R. MCGILL, MICHIGAN BUSINESS SCHOOL GUIDE TO THE 
ETHICAL CHALLENGE 84 (2003). 
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Excellence, Thomas Peters and Robert Waterman insist that “[t]he top 
companies make meaning, not just money.”7  Jack Welch, a CEO best 
known for his pursuit of profits, not ethics, similarly insists that “numbers 
aren’t the vision, numbers are the product.” Although they cannot be 
disregarded, they should not achieve “such priority that [leaders] fail to 
deliver on the things that really matter to the company in the long run: its 
culture . . . its values.”8  In fact, that is useful advice, and had he followed it 
his record might have been less mixed.9
Social Responsibility and Financial Performance 
  But when and whether ethics pays 
is much more complicated than this commentary generally suggests. 
A wide range of studies have attempted to address the relationship 
between social responsibility and financial performance among businesses, 
but surprisingly little work has focused on law firms.  That work, discussed 
below, has looked only to the correlation between support of pro bono 
activities and profitability, not to broader issues of ethical culture.  In the 
business context, researchers have considered a wide range of measures, 
but these efforts have been complicated by the absence of any consistent, 
standardized criteria of social responsibility. No widely shared 
methodologies are available for comparing organizations’ records on many 
dimensions such as diversity, community relations, philanthropy, and 
environmental stewardship.10
 
 7. THOMAS J. PETERS & ROBERT H. WATERMAN, IN SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE: LESSONS 
FROM AMERICA’S BEST-RUN COMPANIES 279 (1982); see also ROBERT C. SOLOMON, ETHICS 
AND EXCELLENCE 44, 47 (1992). 
  Moreover, correlations do not establish 
causation and any documented relationships between financial and social 
performance may run in either or both directions.  In some cases, 
profitability may drive benevolence: organizations that are doing well have 
more resources to invest in doing good.  Alternatively, attention to moral 
values may improve financial performance by improving relations with 
various stakeholders: employees, clients, customers, suppliers, and 
community members. These factors also may be interrelated, and mediated 
by other variables.  Social performance could be both a cause and 
 8. ROBERT SLATER, JACK WELCH ON LEADERSHIP 51, 55 (2004).  For a discussion of 
Welch’s ethical record, see id. at 133-39; Michael E. Brown & Linda K. Treviño, Is Values-
Based Leadership Ethical Leadership?, in EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON VALUES IN 
ORGANIZATIONS 151, 166 (Stephen W. Gilliland et al. eds., 2003); Gellerman, supra note 5, 
at 90. 
 9. See sources cited supra, note 8. 
 10. STEPHEN J. GARONE, THE LINK BETWEEN CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP AND FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE 3, 5-9 (1999); Sandra A. Waddock & Samuel B. Graves, The Corporate 
Social Performance-Financial Performance Link, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 303, 304 (1997). 
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consequence of financial performance, but the strength of either 
relationship could be significantly affected by additional industry-specific 
factors.11
Despite these methodological complications, the overall direction of 
research findings is instructive.  Some studies have compared the social 
performance of organizations with high and low financial returns.
 
12  Other 
surveys have looked for relationships between social and financial 
performance among all Standard and Poors 500 companies.13  Although 
results vary, few studies find a purely negative correlation.  In one 
overview of ninety-five surveys, only four found a negative relationship; 
fifty-five found a positive relationship; twenty-two found no relationship 
and eighteen found a mixed relationship.14
A similar pattern emerges from qualitative and quantitative research that 
addresses the impact of specific ethical behaviors on financial results or on 
measures likely to affect such results, such as employee relations and 
public reputation.  The vast majority of these studies find significant 
positive relationships.  For example, companies with stated commitments 
to ethical behavior have a higher mean financial performance than 
companies lacking such commitments.
 
15 Employees who view their 
organization as supporting fair and ethical conduct, and its leadership as 
caring about ethical issues, observe less unethical behavior and perform 
better along a range of dimensions; they are more willing to share 
information and knowledge, and to “go the extra mile” in meeting job 
requirements.16
 
 11. See Waddock & Graves, supra note 
  Employees also show more concern for the customer or 
client when employers show more concern for them, and workers who feel 
justly treated respond in kind; they are less likely to engage in petty 
10, at 304. 
 12. See PAINE, VALUE SHIFT, supra note 5, at 52; see also GARONE, supra note 10, at 6; 
JOSHUA DANIEL MARGOLIS & JAMES PATRICK WALSH, PEOPLE AND PROFITS? THE SEARCH 
FOR A LINK BETWEEN A COMPANY’S SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE (2001); Elisabet 
Garriega & Domenec Mele, Corporate Social Responsibility Theories: Mapping the 
Territory, 53 BUS. ETHICS J. 51 (2004). 
 13. See Waddock & Graves, supra note 10, at 307-16. 
 14. MARGOLIS & WALSH, supra note 12, at 10-11. 
 15. See the studies discussed in Elena G. Procario-Foley & David F. Bean, Institutions 
of Higher Education: Cornerstones in Building Ethical Organizations, 6 TEACHING BUS. 
ETHICS 101, 102 (2002). 
 16. See LINDA KLEBE TREVIÑO & GARY R. WEAVER, MANAGING ETHICS IN BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS: SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES 233 (2003) [hereinafter TREVINO & 
WEAVER, MANAGING ETHICS]; studies cited in PAINE, VALUE SHIFT, supra note 5, at 42-44; 
Kim S. Cameron et al., Exploring the Relationships Between Organizational Virtuousness 
and Performance, 47 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 766 passim (2004); Tom R. Tyler & Steven L. 
Blader, Social Identity and Fairness Judgments, in EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON VALUES IN 
ORGANIZATIONS 67, 69-75 (Stephen W. Gilliland et al. eds., 2003). 
CHRISTENSEN_RHODE 2/3/2011  10:10 PM 
2005] PROFITS AND PROFESSIONALISM 105 
dishonesty such as pilfering, fudging on hours and expenses, or misusing 
business opportunities.17  The financial payoffs are obvious.  Employee 
satisfaction improves customer satisfaction and retention, enhances 
workplace trust, furthers cooperation and innovation, and saves substantial 
costs resulting from misconduct and surveillance designed to prevent it.18
Such findings are consistent with well-documented principles of 
individual behavior and group dynamics.  People care deeply about 
“organizational justice” and perform better when they believe that their 
workplace deals justly with its stakeholders.
 
19  Workers also respond to 
cues from peers and leaders.  Virtue begets virtue, and observing moral 
behavior by others promotes similar conduct.20  Employers reap the 
rewards in higher morale, recruitment and retention.21
Ethical Reputation, Ethical Counseling, and Financial Value 
 
A reputation for ethical conduct also has financial value.  In the legal 
profession, it can attract clients and employees, and build constructive 
relationships with opposing counsel and government regulators.  One of 
lawyers’ most crucial contributions involves helping clients live up to their 
best instincts and deepest values.  Even highly profit-driven businesses 
often need and want counselors who can provide a “corporate 
conscience.”22  In that capacity, lawyers can help clients evaluate short-
term economic objectives in light of long-term concerns that include 
maintaining a reputation for social responsibility and managerial 
integrity.23
 
 17. TREVIÑO & WEAVER, MANAGING ETHICS, supra note 
  Neither lawyers’ nor clients’ long-term interests are served by 
eroding the institutional frameworks on which law and markets ultimately 
depend.  Norms like good faith, honesty, and fair dealing are essential for 
16, at 233; PAINE, VALUE 
SHIFT, supra note 5, at 45; Robert B. Cialdini, Social Influence and the Triple Tumor of 
Organizational Dishonesty, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS 
ETHICS 53-56 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996). 
 18. GARONE, supra note 10, at 11; Cialdini, supra note 17, at 56. 
 19. Tyler & Blader, supra note 16, at 67-79; PAINE, VALUE SHIFT, supra note 5, at 46. 
 20. PAINE, VALUE SHIFT, supra note 5, at 45-49; Cameron et al., supra note 16, at 773. 
 21. GARONE, supra note 10, at 11; PAINE, VALUE SHIFT, supra note 5, at 45; Cameron et 
al., supra note 16, at 770-83. 
 22. See RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 65; Deborah L. Rhode, 
Ethics in Counseling, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 591, 608 (2003); Robert Gordon, Why Lawyers Can’t 
Just Be Hired Guns, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND 
REGULATION 42 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000); Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, 
Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1161 
(1958). 
 23. Robert Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 26-28, 71-74 
(1988). 
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efficient commercial markets and regulatory systems.  These values require 
some shared restraint in the pursuit of short-term interests.  Legal processes 
present frequent opportunities for obstruction, obfuscation, and 
overreaching.  Lawyers who take advantage of such opportunities 
undermine expectations of trust and cooperation.  These expectations are 
common goods on which both lawyers and clients ultimately depend.  In 
the short term, free riders can profit by violating norms that others respect.  
But these values cannot survive in contexts where deviance becomes 
common.  Over the long run, a single-minded pursuit of short-term self-
interests is likely to prove self-defeating for both the profession and the 
public.24
Business ethics commentators have made similar points, and have 
attempted to quantify the reputational costs of organizational misconduct 
and social irresponsibility.
 
25  As they note, these costs can be substantial, 
and can dramatically affect market share and stock value.26  According to 
some studies, most of the decline in shareholder value following allegations 
or proof of illegal behavior reflects injuries to reputation, not prospective 
fines or liability damages.27  A substantial body of research also suggests 
that the goodwill flowing from an ethical reputation can buffer 
organizations during periods of difficulty resulting from financial, 
consumer product, or environmental scandals.28
 
 24. See id. at 54. 
  A celebrated case in point 
is Johnson & Johnson’s decision to recall Tylenol after an incident of 
product tampering.  It was a socially responsible decision that was highly 
risky in financial terms; pulling the capsules cost more than $100 million, 
and many experts at the time believed that it would doom one of the 
company’s most profitable products.  But Johnson & Johnson’s reputation 
for integrity, reinforced by the recall decision, maintained public 
confidence, and the product bounced back with new safety features and no 
 25. CHARLES J. FOMBRUN, REPUTATION: REALIZING VALUE FROM THE CORPORATE IMAGE 
85 (1996); GRAHAME DOWLING, CREATING CORPORATE REPUTATIONS: IDENTITY, IMAGE, 
AND PERFORMANCE 219 (2001); PAINE, VALUE SHIFT, supra note 5, at 48-49; Cialdini, supra 
note 17.  See also Jennifer Reese, America’s Most Admired Corporations, FORTUNE, Feb. 8, 
1993, at 44 (noting that admired corporations tend to have good ethical records); PAINE, 
VALUE SHIFT, supra note 5, at 48-49. 
 26. PAINE, VALUE SHIFT, supra note 5, at 49; Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., 
The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear From Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & ECON. 
757 (1993). 
 27. Karpoff & Lott, supra note 26, at 760. 
 28. PAINE, VALUE SHIFT, supra note 5, at 49; Cameron et al., supra note 16, at 773; 
William J. Holstein, The Snowball Effect of Volunteer Work, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2004, at 
C12. 
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long-term damage.29
Unhappy endings from socially irresponsible decisions also abound.  A 
notorious example of a corporate public relations disaster that could have 
been averted was Royal Dutch Shell’s decision to sink an obsolete oil rig 
with potentially radioactive residues in the North Sea despite  strong 
environmental protests.  The resulting adverse publicity and consumer 
boycotts took a huge financial toll.
 
30  Survey data from the United States 
and abroad also reveal that most individuals believe that companies should 
set high ethical standards and contribute to broader social goals.  For 
example, between one-third and two-thirds of American consumers report 
that they seriously consider corporate citizenship when making purchases, 
and a quarter recall boycotting a product because of disapproval of the 
company’s actions.31
When Ethics Doesn’t Pay: The Case for Values 
  Corporate lawyers who take seriously their 
obligation to represent the organization, not just its current managers, can 
help insure that these long term reputational costs receive consideration in 
board decision making. 
Examples of the high costs of moral myopia are not uncommon; 
professional and business ethics texts offer countless variations on the same 
theme.  But the reasons why the examples are so abundant also point up the 
problems with “ethics pays” as an all-purpose prescription.  As Harvard 
Business School Professor Lynne Sharp Paine puts it, a more accurate 
guide would be “ethics counts.”32
1. legal and regulatory systems are effective in enforcing ethical 
  Whether doing good results in doing 
well depends on the institutional and social context.  In the corporate 
setting, Paine notes, the “financial case for values” is strongest when 
certain conditions are met: 
 
 29. PAINE, VALUE SHIFT, supra note 5, at 30; JAMES BURKE, A CAREER IN AMERICAN 
BUSINESS (Harv. Bus. Sch. Case No. 389-177, 390-030, 1989); DALLA COSTA, supra note 5, 
at 217. 
 30. PAINE, VALUE SHIFT, supra note 5, at 20-22; Michael D. Watkins & Max H. 
Bazerman, Predictable Surprises: The Disasters You Should Have Seen Coming, HARV. 
BUS. REV., Mar. 2003, at 72. 
 31. HILL & KNOWLTON, 2001 CORPORATE CITIZEN WATCH SURVEY (2001) (one third); 
Caring in the Community, MGMT. TODAY, Mar. 1995, at 19-20; Ronald Alsop, The Best 
Corporate Reputations in America: Johnson & Johnson (Think Babies!) Turns Up Tops, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 1999, at B1 (boycott).  In one international poll, a fifth reported 
rewarding or punishing a company for its social performance and another fifth considered 
doing so.  ENVIRONICS INT’L, LTD., IN COOPERATION WITH THE PRINCE OF WALES BUSINESS 
LEADERS FORUM & THE CONFERENCE BOARD, THE MILLENNIUM POLL ON CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY (1999); see also PAINE, VALUE SHIFT, supra note 5, at 82, 111. 
 32. Id. at 134. 
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norms; 
2. individuals have choice in employment, investment, and 
consumer decisions and are well informed concerning those 
choices; and 
3. the society  expects organizations to operate within an ethical 
framework.33
When “ethics pays,” it is generally because an informed public wants it 
to, and because leaders in business, government, and the professions have 
designed effective incentive and compliance systems. 
 
It is, however, naive and misleading to suggest that these systems are 
always in place.34  In law, problems arise not only because legal and ethical 
enforcement systems are highly imperfect, but also because the public is 
ambivalent in its desires.  Ethics is what clients want in other peoples’ 
lawyers.  In their own attorneys, zealous advocacy in pursuit of short-term 
interests often appears preferable.35
A further problem with “ethics pays” as the core argument for ethical 
practice is that it is ultimately self-defeating.  To make the case for 
“values” turn solely on instrumental considerations is to reinforce patterns 
of reasoning that undermine ethical commitments.  We respect moral 
conduct most when it occurs despite, not because of, self-interest.  What 
defines ethical behavior is a commitment to do right whether or not it 
carries a cost.  Our challenge as a profession and a society is not only to 
find ways of minimizing that cost, but also to respect and reinforce 
adherence to fundamental principles when they come at a price. 
  As a consequence, many practice areas 
end up with differential markets in morality.  A tidy living flows from 
conduct euphemistically described in terms like “bombing,” “hard ball,” or 
“scorched earth.” 
II. PRO BONO CONTRIBUTIONS: DOING WELL BY DOING GOOD 
Similar points are applicable to charitable contributions.  Pro bono 
activities and financial support have many payoffs for lawyers, legal 
employers, and the legal profession generally.  But there is also value in 
encouraging such contributions when they are motivated by intrinsic rather 
than extrinsic rewards. 
 
 33. Id. at 76. 
 34. For examples, see Amar Bhide & Howard H. Stevenson, Why Be Honest If Honesty 
Doesn’t Pay, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 121. 
 35. See RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 6-7; A.B.A., PERCEPTIONS 
OF THE UNITED STATES JUSTICE SYSTEM 59 (1999). 
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Benefits to Lawyers 
A wide array of research, both on lawyers and on the public generally, 
finds that benefiting others also benefits ourselves.  Volunteering is 
correlated with both physical and mental health.  Compared with the 
population generally, people who regularly assist others apart from family 
and friends have longer lives, less pain, stress, and depression, and greater 
self-esteem.36  Volunteers also report a sense of physical well being, both 
immediately after helping and when the service is remembered, and are 
more likely to be happy with their lives.37  One of the most commonly cited 
benefits is that such assistance makes individuals “feel better” about 
themselves; other frequently noted rewards include opportunities to 
“broaden horizons,” “do something worthwhile,” build social relationships, 
and gain educational or employment-related experience.38
Although the correlation between volunteer activities and well-being 
does not establish a causal relationship, the evidence available suggests that 
such a relationship exists. That evidence includes the high frequency of 
individuals’ subjective experience of benefits, the consistent association of 
volunteering with objective measures of health, and the biological 
indications of a “helper’s high.”
 
39  Although the neurological basis for 
heightened physiological well-being is not well understood, some research 
suggests that caregiving activities reduce stress, which improves the 
functioning of the immune system and triggers the release of endorphins 
that produce pleasurable physical sensations.40  So too, volunteer work, like 
other forms of organizational activity, tends to reduce participants’ sense of 
isolation and increases their sense of efficacy and self-esteem.41
For lawyers, pro bono involvement brings this same range of 
professional and personal rewards.  Particularly for young attorneys, such 
 
 
 36. See research summarized in ALAN LUKS WITH PEGGY PAYNE, THE HEALING POWER 
OF DOING GOOD: THE HEALTH AND SPIRITUAL BENEFITS OF HELPING OTHERS xi-xii, 17-18, 
45-54, 60 (2d ed. 2001); John Wilson & Marc Musick, The Effects of Volunteering, 62 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 141, 142-43 (1999); Marc A. Musick et al., Volunteering and Mortality 
Among Older Adults: Findings from a National Sample, 548 J. GERONTOLOGY S173, S178 
(1999). 
 37. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY 331 (2000); LUKS WITH PAYNE, supra note 36, at xi-xiii, 17-18, 118-19; John 
M. Darley, Altruism and Prosocial Behavior Research: Reflections and Prospects, in 
PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 312-27 (Margaret S. Clark ed., 1991). 
 38. Ram A. Cnaan & Robin S. Goldberg-Glen, Measuring Motivation in Human 
Services, 27 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 269, 275-79 (1991); FRANCIE OSTROWER, WHY THE 
WEALTHY GIVE: THE CULTURE OF ELITE PHILANTHROPY 13-14 (1995). 
 39. See sources cited in supra notes 18 and 19. 
 40. LUKS WITH PAYNE, supra note 36, at 47-55. 
 41. Wilson & Musick, supra note 36, at 153-55. 
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work can also provide valuable training, contacts, trial experience, and 
leadership opportunities.42  Through pro bono programs, lawyers can 
develop new areas of expertise and demonstrate marketable skills.  
Participation in community groups, charitable organizations, high visibility 
litigation, and other public interest activities allows attorneys to expand 
their perspectives, enhance their reputations, and attract paying clients.43
Lawyers also report the same kinds of psychological rewards from 
service that motivates other volunteer activity.  Pro bono work can be a 
way to “give back,” to promote social justice, and to make an immediate 
positive difference in someone’s life.
 
44  For most private practitioners, 
whose paid work is predominantly commercial, volunteer activity allows 
them to express the values that directed them to legal careers in the first 
instance.  American Bar Association (“ABA”) surveys consistently find 
that lawyers’ greatest dissatisfaction with their practice is a lack of 
“contribution to the social good.”45
 
 42. Esther Lardent, Pro Bono Work Is Good for Business, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 19, 2001, at 
B20; W. Terence Walsh, Pro Bono 2000: A Bridge Over Troubled Waters, GA. B.J., June 
2000, at 12, 15; John Ryan, Duty Calls, CA. L. BUS. Feb. 12, 2001, at 17; Daniel Becker, 
The Many Faces of Pro Bono, WASH. LAW., May 2001, at 22, 30; The Role of the Private 
Bar and Pro Bono Service in Meeting the Legal Needs of the Twenty-First Century, 3 N.Y. 
CITY L. REV. 171, 186 (2000); Lawyers of This Year, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 25, 2000, at A24; 
Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Stricture and Structure: The Social and Cultural Context of Pro 
Bono Work in Wall Street Firms, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1689, 1693-94 (2002); Robert 
Granfield & Thomas Koenig, “It’s Hard To Be a Human Being and a Lawyer”: Young 
Attorneys and the Confrontation with Ethical Ambiguity in Legal Practice, 105 W. VA. L. 
REV. 495 (2003). 
  Pro bono work can provide that 
contribution.  As the pro bono director of one Wall Street firm noted, 
lawyers “talk about their [pro bono] work in a way they’ve never done 
 43. John B. Heinz et al., Lawyers’ Roles in Voluntary Associations: Declining Social 
Capital?, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 597, 599 (2001); Jill Schachner Chanen, Pro Bono’s 
Pros—and Cons: Rewards Are Great But It Takes a Deft Balance of Time and Effort, 
A.B.A. J., May 1998, at 80; Donald W. Hoagland, Community Service Makes Better 
Lawyers, in THE LAW FIRM AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 104, 109 (1995); Jack W. Londen, The 
Impact of Pro Bono Work on Law Firm Economics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 925 (l996); 
Thomas J. Brannan, Pro Bono: By Choice or By Chance?, 84 ILL. B.J., Sept. 1996, at 481; 
Ronald J. Tabak, Integration of Pro Bono Into Law Firm Practice, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
931, 932 (1996). 
 44. Ruth M. Bond, Taking Time Out to Help Those in Need with Legal Burdens Brings 
Satisfaction, Pride, S.F. DAILY J., Jan. 15, 2002, at 4; Tanya Neiman, Nothing Cures 
Like . . ., 26 S.F. ATT’Y, Feb.-Mar. 2000, at 44, 45; Walsh, supra note 42; Becker, supra 
note 42, at 22; Evelyn Apgar, General Counsel, Pro Bono Gripes Galore, 6 N.J. LAW., Nov. 
1997, at 3. 
 45. A.B.A., YOUNG LAWYERS DIV., CAREER SATISFACTION SURVEY 20 (2000) 
[hereinafter A.B.A. 2000 CAREER SATISFACTION SURVEY]; A.B.A., YOUNG LAWYERS DIV., 
CAREER SATISFACTION SURVEY (1995) [hereinafter A.B.A. 1995 CAREER SATISFACTION 
SURVEY]. 
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before.  People say, ‘This is the best day of my life.’”46
Benefits to Legal Employers 
 
By promoting participants’ professional growth, reputation, and 
satisfaction, support of volunteer service also promotes the interests of their 
employers.  Research on private-sector organizations finds that employee 
loyalty and morale are significantly greater when organizations are 
involved in their communities, and that employer-giving levels correlate 
positively with public image and financial performance.47
For legal employers, strong pro bono programs can produce further, 
although hard to quantify, benefits in terms of retention, recruitment, and 
job performance.
  Of course, as 
noted earlier, correlations do not establish causation, and it is unclear 
whether outstanding financial performance drives charitable contributions 
or the other way around.  Alternatively, causal relationships might run in 
both directions.  High-earning organizations have the most resources to 
invest in unpaid public service.  They may also be in the best position to 
reap reputational rewards from such efforts, because they can afford to 
pursue and publicize their efforts. 
48  Lack of career development opportunities is one of the 
main reasons that lawyers change jobs.49
 
 46. Vivia Chen, Going Corporate, AM. LAW., Sept. 2003, at 94 (quoting William Fogg). 
  Although relatively few surveyed 
 47. Shari Caudron, Volunteerism; And the Bottom Line, INDUSTRY WK., Feb. 1994, at 
13, 18; Craig Smith, The New Corporate Philanthropy, 74 HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 
1994, at 105; Barbara R. Bartkus et al., Governance and Corporate Philanthropy: 
Restraining Robin Hood?, 41 BUS. & SOC’Y 319 (2002); CATHLEEN WILD, CORPORATE 
VOLUNTEER PROGRAMS: BENEFITS TO BUSINESS, REPORT NO. 1029, 9, 11, 20-21 (1993); 
William J. Holstein, The Snowball Effect of Volunteer Work, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2004, at 
C12; GARONE, supra note 10, at 11; Jan Larson, Sweet Charity, 2 MARKETING TOOLS 3, 68 
(May 1995); Bill Shaw & Frederick R. Post, A Moral Basis for Corporate Philanthropy, 12 
J. BUS. ETHICS 745, 746, 749 (1993); Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of Corporate Giving: 
Tax Expenditures, the Nature of the Corporation, and the Social Construction of Charity, 44 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 57-60 (1994). 
 48. Londen, supra note 43, at 925; John Ryan, Rescue Mission, CA. L. BUS., Feb. 12, 
2001, at 15 (quoting Jack Londen); Carrie Johnson, As the Need for Free Legal Helps Soars 
Amid Cutbacks in Federal Programs, Some Law Firms Are Responding by Moving Full-
Time Pro Bono Lawyers Into Their Ranks, LEG. TIMES, June 30, 1997, at S44; Memorandum 
to New York Partners of Clifford Chance Re. Associates Concerns (Oct. 15, 2002) (noting 
that firm’s unsupportive attitude toward pro bono was a “significant minus” in recruiting 
and adversely affected some associates’ perception of firm culture), 
http://www.lawcost.com/clifchancememo.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2005). 
 49. JUDITH N. COLLINS, NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT FOUNDATION (“NALP”), THE 
LATERAL LAWYER: WHY THEY LEAVE AND WHAT MAY MAKE THEM STAY 24, 43-52, 77 
(2001); AUSTIN G. ANDERSON & ARTHUR G. GREENE, THE EFFECTIVE ASSOCIATE TRAINING 
PROGRAM: IMPROVING FIRM PERFORMANCE, PROFITABILITY AND PROSPECTIVE PARTNERS 
(1999). 
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lawyers cite inadequate support for pro bono work as a major reason for 
leaving a position, the opportunity for such work may be an important part 
of why other lawyers stay; it can significantly enhance the quality of their 
professional lives.50  As one winner of a bar pro bono award noted, such 
activity is an “enormous morale booster for the entire firm.”51  “Everyone 
feels that they touched a life . . .  No office picnics or parties can give you 
that.”52
Public opinion research also confirms the reputational value of pro bono 
work.  In one representative survey, which asked what could improve the 
image of lawyers, the response most often chosen was their provision of 
free legal services to the needy; two-thirds of those surveyed indicated that 
it would improve their opinion of the profession.
 
53  In another poll, almost 
half of those responding thought that lawyers did not contribute enough to 
their communities through donations of time, legal services, or money.  
Only a quarter disagreed.54
The Costs of Cost-Benefit Justifications 
  Legal employers who make substantial 
contributions can help challenge such perceptions, while establishing 
themselves as exceptionally responsible citizens. 
As is true with other ethical commitments, to justify pro bono 
involvement in solely instrumental terms may undermine its moral 
significance and distort charitable priorities.  The problems are well-
documented in corporate philanthropy, where organizational leaders often 
use business giving as a form of “social currency” that enhances status and 
self-image rather than effectively addresses social needs.55
 
 50. JUDITH N. COLLINS, supra note 
  The demand for 
49, at 156, Table A-22 (only 7.2 percent of lawyers 
cited lack of credit for pro bono work).  For the value of pro bono programs in retaining 
lawyers by increasing their workplace satisfaction, see sources cited in notes 48-49 supra. 
 51. Talcott J. Franklin, Practical Pro Bono: How Public Source Can Enhance Your 
Practice, 10 S.C. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 14, 19. 
 52. Franklin, supra note 51, at 19-20. 
 53. PETER D. HART RESEARCH ASSOC., INC., A SURVEY OF ATTITUDES NATIONWIDE 
TOWARD LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 18 (Jan. 1993); see also Gary A. Hengstler, Vox 
Populi, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at 61 (citing survey data finding that almost half of those 
surveyed believed that providing free legal services would improve the profession’s image).  
A survey by the Oregon bar found when individuals were asked what information might 
cause them to have a higher opinion of the legal profession, they gave top ratings to 
knowledge that lawyers had given free legal advice to mass disaster victims and had made 
financial contributions to community legal services organizations.  Karen Garst, Reporting 
on Survey, Part II, OR. ST. B. BULL., Dec. 1996, at 39, 46. 
 54. A.B.A., PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 35, at 59 (1999). 
 55. MICHAEL USEEM, THE INNER CIRCLE 121-26 (1984); Usha C. V. Haley, Corporate 
Contributions as Managerial Masques: Reframing Corporate Contributions as Strategies to 
Influence Society, 28 J. MGMT. STUD. 485, 494 (1991). 
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“value added” from charitable donations has even led some companies to 
spend more on advertising their good deeds than on the donations 
themselves.56
So too, in the legal context, viewing pro bono programs largely as a way 
of training junior attorneys or advancing reputational interests may ill-serve 
client or societal concerns.  Many law firms make inadequate efforts to 
supervise pro bono work or to ensure that participants have “cultural 
competence” in assisting low-income minority clients.
 
57  Other legal 
employers prevent attorneys from representing causes that might offend 
current or potential paying clients.58  Yet these are precisely the causes 
most in need of assistance.  Restrictions on government-funded legal aid 
programs exclude broad categories of clients who have nowhere else to go, 
such as prisoners, undocumented aliens, women seeking abortions, or 
school desegregation plaintiffs.59  Without pro bono assistance, groups that 
are most politically vulnerable are legally vulnerable as well.  As bar codes 
and commentary acknowledge, one of lawyers’ most crucial roles involves 
representation of causes likely to offend political clients.60
By contrast, when charitable assistance is viewed primarily in 
instrumental terms, it often ends up targeting those least in need of charity.  
Traditionally, most of lawyers’ unpaid work has gone not to public interest 
and low-income groups, but to friends, family members, and organizations 
like symphonies or Jaycees, which serve primarily middle- and upper-
income individuals.
  Obvious 
examples involve the pro bono counsel who defended alleged Communists 
during the McCarthy movement, southern civil rights workers during the 
1950s and 1960s, and seemingly pathological death-row defendants in 
recently successful DNA-based appeals.  These attorneys often paid a 
substantial professional price.  We are all richer because of it. 
61  Many lawyers also have defined pro bono service to 
include matters where a fee turns out to be uncollectible.62
 
 56. Mary Lyn Stoll, The Ethics of Marketing Good Corporate Conduct, 41 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 121, 124 (2002). 
  No 
comprehensive data are available on how much unpaid assistance attorneys 
 57. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE: PUBLIC SERVICE 
AND THE PROFESSIONS 40-41, 136 (2005) [hereinafter RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE]. 
 58. Id. at 146-48; Esther F. Lardent, Positional Conflict in the Pro Bono Context: 
Ethical Considerations and Market Forces, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2279, 2280 (1999). 
 59. 45 C.F.R. § 1610-42 (1999); DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3-4, 105 
(2004). 
 60. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY E.C. 2-27 (1986); RHODE, IN THE 
INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 54. 
 61. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE, supra note 57, at 14. 
 62. Id. at 19; CARROLL SERON, THE BUSINESS OF PRACTICING LAW 129-33 (1996); Gary 
Spencer, Pro Bono Data Show Little Improvement, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 5, 1999, at 1. 
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now provide or which clients benefit.  Only three states require lawyers to 
report pro bono work, only one (Florida) makes the information public, and 
even it does not identify recipients.  What research is available, including 
my own national survey of some 3000 lawyers, suggests that the American 
bar averages less than half an hour a week and fifty cents a day in pro bono 
contributions, as lawyers define the term.63  Little of that support benefits 
low-income individuals.64
Large numbers of lawyers are also unhappy with their pro bono 
opportunities.  American Bar Association surveys of young lawyers 
consistently have found that their greatest source of workplace 
dissatisfaction is a lack of “contribution to the social good.”
 
65  So too, 
when a recent joint study by the National Association of Law Placement 
Foundation and the American Bar Foundation asked relatively new entrants 
to the profession to rate their satisfaction with sixteen aspects of practice, 
they ranked pro bono opportunities second to last.66
In my own survey, about half of lawyers reported dissatisfaction with the 
amount of their pro bono work.
 
67  The central problem involved employer 
policies that failed to value public service in practice as well as principle.  
Only a quarter of surveyed lawyers’ workplaces (twenty-five percent) fully 
counted pro bono work toward billable hours.68  Such findings are 
consistent with other recent survey data, and they reflect a culture that 
undermines public service commitments.69
 
 63. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE, supra note 
  In effect, as many lawyers 
57, at 20.  The most recent American 
Bar Association survey, which found that two thirds of lawyers averaged thirty-nine hours 
on pro bono work per year is not inconsistent with that finding, given that the survey used 
an extremely broad definition of pro bono work. That definition, based on Model Rule 6.1, 
included participation in activities “for improving the legal system or the legal profession 
through groups such as bar associations or judicial committees.” A.B.A., SUPPORTING 
JUSTICE: A REPORT ON THE PRO BONO WORK OF AMERICA’S LAWYERS 4, 10 (Aug. 2005).  
According to the American Lawyer’s most recent survey of the 200 most profitable firms, 
only thirty-six percent of lawyers performed twenty hours or more of pro bono work.  Aric 
Press, Brother, Can You Spare 20 Hours, AM. LAW., Sept. 1, 2005, available at 
http://www.americanlawyer.com. 
 64. Id. at 14, 19; Judith L. Maute, Pro Bono Publico in Oklahoma, Time for Change, 53 
OKLA. L. REV. 527, 562-63 (2000). 
 65. A.B.A. 2000 CAREER SATISFACTION SURVEY, supra note 45, at 28; A.B.A. 1995 
CAREER SATISFACTION SURVEY, supra note 45. 
 66. NALP & THE AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, AFTER THE J.D.: FIRST RESULTS OF A 
NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS 49 (2004) [hereinafter NALP & THE AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, AFTER THE J.D.]. 
 67. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE, supra note 57, at 148. 
 68. Id. at 138. 
 69. In an American Lawyer survey, only twenty-eight percent of respondents’ firms 
credited time on pro bono activities toward minimum billable hour requirements.  
Commission AmLaw 100 and Law Firm Questionnaires, AM. LAWYER, Aug. 2002, at 52. 
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noted, pro bono service was permissible only if it occurred “outside the 
normal work hours.”70  Given what passes for “normal” in many firms, the 
price of public service is often prohibitive.  Lawyers with substantial 
family obligations were particularly likely to see non-billable work as a 
“luxury” they could not afford.71
Other limitations on pro bono participation arise from informal 
workplace norms and practices.  Only about half of lawyers’ firms 
subsidized all the costs of pro bono matters.
 
72  Only ten percent of 
surveyed lawyers indicated that their employers valued such work as much 
as billable hours in promotion and compensation decisions.73  Almost a 
fifth believed that pro bono contributions were not viewed as important, 
and almost half felt they were negatively viewed.74  In many firms, 
attitudes ranged from active discouragement to not-so-benign neglect.  In 
essence, “money has been the absolute bottom line, so pro bono . . . is not 
rewarded.”75
A related problem involves the kind of pro bono involvement that 
employers permit.  Almost half of the lawyers in my sample were 
dissatisfied with the type of pro bono work permitted.
 
76  Many of these 
lawyers ended up with unpaid work that they did not consider pro bono, 
such as favors for clients and their relatives, or the personal legal matters of 
partners and their families.77  Such work seldom yields the kind of 
experience, visibility, and contacts that has career benefits.78  Other 
attorneys were limited to services for the “pet organizations” of certain 
partners, or work that would benefit the “corporate image.”79
 
 70. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE, supra note 
  Not only do 
these priorities discourage involvement and skew the allocation of scarce 
charitable resources, they also undermine the legitimacy of pro bono 
programs.  That risk is particularly great when lawyers’ self-interests are 
implicated.  As one attorney observed, “Right now this firm’s idea of pro 
57, at 138. 
 71. Id. at 138; see also Bryant G. Garth, Noblesse Oblige as an Alternative Career 
Strategy, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 93, 110 (2004) (noting time constraints that limit women’s 
participation). 
 72. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE, supra note 57, at 139. 
 73. Id. at 140. 
 74. Id. (eighteen percent reported that pro bono activities were viewed as not important, 
and forty-four percent believed that they were negatively viewed). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 148 (forty-three percent were dissatisfied). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Garth, supra note 71, at 105. 
 79. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE, supra note 57, at 148. 
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bono is to handle a partner’s personal matters for free.  It’s a joke.”80
The devaluation of public service in many workplaces represents a 
missed opportunity for all concerned. A preoccupation with short-term 
profits overlooks the long-term benefits to lawyers, their employers, and 
their communities.  And to view unpaid work in primarily instrumental 
terms, as a way to provide training for practitioners or favors for friends 
and families, undermines the values on which charitable commitment 
depends. 
 
III. BALANCED LIVES AND BOTTOM LINES 
A final casualty of the bottom-line orientation of legal workplaces 
involves quality of life.  Over the last half century, billable hours for 
lawyers have dramatically risen, but what has not changed are the number 
of hours in the day.81  A 1960s ABA Lawyers’ Handbook defined a 
“normal” schedule as “approximately 1,300 fee earning hours per year.”82  
“Normal” now is closer to 2000 hours.83  To charge honestly at current 
levels often requires working sixty-hour weeks and the obligations in many 
organizations are even higher.84  As one associate logging those hours 
responded to a question about her quality of life, “We can’t live like this.  
This is not a life.”85  Most surveyed lawyers report that they do not have 
sufficient time for themselves and their families.86  Only a third to a half 
believe that their employers support balanced lives and flexible workplace 
arrangements.87
 
 80. Id. 
  Only a fifth of mothers who are working full time 
 81. For earlier work that makes similar points concerning balanced lives, see RHODE, IN 
THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 10, 216 n.21; Deborah L. Rhode, Balanced 
Lives: Changing the Culture of Legal Practice, A.B.A. COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE 
PROFESSION (2002) [hereinafter RHODE, Balanced Lives], available at 
http://abanet.org/women (last visited Oct. 15, 2005); Deborah L. Rhode, Balanced Lives for 
Lawyers, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2207 (2002). 
 82. WOMEN’S BAR ASS’N OF MASS., MORE THAN PART-TIME: THE EFFECT OF REDUCED 
HOURS ARRANGEMENTS ON THE RETENTION, RECRUITMENT, AND SUCCESS OF WOMEN 
ATTORNEYS IN LAW FIRMS 7 (2000). 
 83. See sources cited in RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 10. 
 84. Id. at 35; Patrick Schlitz, On Being A Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of An 
Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 58 VAND. L. REV. 871, 891-95 (1999). 
 85. Cynthia Fuchs Epstein et al., Glass Ceilings and Open Doors: Women’s 
Advancement in the Legal Profession, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 385 (l995). 
 86. A.B.A. 2000 CAREER SATISFACTION SURVEY, supra note 45, at 28 (Table 20). 
 87. Gregory J. Mazores, Association Retention for Law Firms: What Are Your Lawyers 
Saying About You?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 903, 905 (2002) (finding that a third of associates 
believe that lawyers at their firms are encouraged to create a balance between work and life 
outside it).  See figures compiled by Cythnia Fuchs Epstein et al., THE PART-TIME 
PARADOX: TIME NORMS, PROFESSIONAL LIVES, FAMILY, AND GENDER 5 (1999) and by the 
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schedules are satisfied with the amount of time that they have for 
childcare.88  Particularly in large firms, where sweatshop schedules are 
most common, some attorneys report finding it “difficult to have a cat, 
much less a family.”89
The Costs of Excessive Hours and Inflexible Schedules 
 
The adverse effects of excessive hours, both to lawyers and their 
employers, are well documented.  For lawyers, overwork is a leading cause 
of disproportionately high rates of stress, substance abuse, reproductive 
dysfunction, and mental health difficulties.90  These, in turn, contribute to 
performance and disciplinary problems that carry a cost for employers and 
clients as well as practitioners.91  Bleary, burned-out lawyers can seldom 
deliver efficient service on a sustained basis.  So too, excessive hourly 
demands contribute to widespread abuses such as meter running and 
fudging time sheets.92
 
National Association of Law Placement, discussed in Martha Neil, Lawyers Shun Firms’ 
Offers of Part-Time Work, CHI. L. BULL., Dec. 18, 2000, at 1 (suggesting that about half of 
surveyed practitioners doubt that their employers truly support flexible workplace 
arrangements). 
 
 88. JEAN E. WALLACE, LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNSEL, RESEARCH REPORT NO RR-00-
02, JUGGLING IT ALL: EXPLORING LAWYERS’ WORK, HOME, AND FAMILY DEMANDS AND 
COPING STRATEGIES 15 (2002). 
 89. SUZANNE NOSSEL & ELIZABETH WESTFALL, PRESUMED EQUAL: WHAT AMERICA’S 
TOP WOMEN LAWYERS REALLY THINK ABOUT THEIR FIRMS 295 (1998). 
 90. Nancy Dart & Marilyn Tucker, Workaholic Lawyers, WASH. LAW., 1990, at 36, 40-
41.  An estimated one-third of American attorneys suffer from depression or from alcohol or 
drug addiction, a rate two-to-three times higher than the population generally.  See sources 
cited in RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 8.  Almost half of women 
lawyers, and almost two-thirds of those working more than forty-five hours a week, report 
that such stress levels have adverse effects on reproductive health.  Marc B. Schenker et al., 
Self- Reported Stress and Reproductive Health of Female Lawyers, 39 J. OCCUPATIONAL & 
ENVTL. MED. 556 (1997); see also Mary Beth Grover, Daddy Stress, FORBES, Sept. 6, 1999, 
at 202 (noting problems for men).  By contrast, adequate time for significant family 
involvement helps to buffer problems experienced in the workplace and improves health and 
performance.  FAYE CROSBY, JUGGLING 86-67 (1991); David Chambers, Accommodation 
and Satisfaction: Women and Men Lawyers and the Balance of Work and Family, 14 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 251, 254 (1991).  For general discussion of the health costs of excessive 
workloads, see JILL ANDRESKY FRASER, WHITE-COLLAR SWEATSHOP 36-37 (2001); 
FAMILIES & WORK INST., FEELING OVERWORKED: WHEN WORK BECOMES TOO MUCH 5-8 
(2001) [hereinafter FAMILIES & WORK INST., FEELING OVERWORKED]. 
 91. It is estimated that substance abuse and mental health difficulties figure into sixty to 
eighty percent of discipline and malpractice cases.  See sources cited in DEBORAH L. RHODE 
& DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 973 (2001).  For general discussion of the effects of 
overwork on job performance, see FAMILIES & WORK INST., FEELING OVERWORKED, supra 
note 90, at 8. 
 92. For inflated time reports, see sources cited in RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, 
supra note 2, at 171; WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE HONEST HOUR: THE ETHICS OF TIME BILLING BY 
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Overly demanding workloads and inflexible schedules impose further 
costs in terms of early attrition.93  Human relations studies find that 
replacing professional workers typically costs between one to one-and-a-
half times their annual salary, and that the loss of an associate runs between 
$200,000 to $500,000.94  That average includes the direct expenses of 
recruiting and retaining a replacement, but does not include intangible 
losses in terms of disrupted relationships with clients and colleagues, and 
diminished productivity while newly hired individuals acquire job-specific 
knowledge.  Although most firms have partnership structures that assume 
substantial attrition, experts agree that current rates are not cost-effective, 
and that the associates who leave early are not necessarily the ones that 
employers want to lose.95  Bar association studies and management 
consultants consistently note that most associates do not begin to generate 
profits until their third or fourth years.96  At that point, almost half have left 
their first employer, and quality of life concerns are a major reason, 
particularly for women.97  Excessive hours and inflexible schedules are a 
major cause of glass ceilings for female attorneys, and the resulting lack of 
gender equality and women mentors in positions of greatest status, security, 
and influence.98
 
ATTORNEYS 3-4 (1996); Lisa Lerman, Blue Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and Expense 
Fraud by Lawyers, 12 GEO. J.  LEGAL ETHICS 205, 259-62 (1999); Henry Maute, A Problem 
of Overbilling by Many Large Firms is Confirmed in Surveys, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 1993, 
at B7.  Some lawyers also “fake face time” by strategies such as calling themselves on an 
office intercom late at night or changing time settings on their computer to send emails at 
very late or early hours.  Ross Guberman, Running from the Law, WASHINGTONIAN, Oct. 
2001, at 51; Joan C. Williams et al., Better on Balance? The Corporate Counsel Work/Life 
Report, 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 367, 392 (2004). 
 
 93. NALP, KEEPING THE KEEPERS: STRATEGIES FOR ASSOCIATE RETENTION IN TIMES OF 
ATTRITION (1998) [hereinafter KEEPING THE KEEPERS]; Debra Baker, Cash and Carry 
Associates, 85 A.B.A. J., May 1999, at 41. 
 94. RHODE, Balanced Lives, supra note 81, at 21; Joan Williams & Cynthia Thomas 
Calvert, Balanced Hours: Effective Part-Time Policies for Washington Law Firms, 8 WM. & 
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 357, 361, 366 (2002) [hereinafter Williams & Calvert, Balanced 
Hours]; Williams et al., supra note 92, at 377 (citing human relations experts for the one to 
one and a half range); Patti Giglio, Rethinking the Hours, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 8, 2004, at 33 
(quoting Joan Williams regarding associate costs). 
 95. NALP, KEEPING THE KEEPERS, supra note 93; Williams & Calvert, Balanced Hours, 
supra note 94, at 367. 
 96. Rhode, Balanced Lives, supra note 81, at 20. 
 97. In the most recent survey by NALP, thirty-eight percent of associates left by the end 
of their third year, and sixty percent by the end of their fifth year.  NALP, BEYOND THE 
BIDDING WAR: A STUDY OF ATTRITION, DEPARTURES, DESTINATIONS, AND WORKLOAD 
INITIATIVES 17 (2001); see also Williams & Calvert, Balanced Hours, supra note 94, at 367. 
 98. JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER 71-73 (2000); BOSTON BAR ASS’N TASK 
FORCE ON WORK-FAMILY CHALLENGES, FACING THE GRAIL: CONFRONTING THE COURSE OF 
WORK FAMILY IMBALANCE 39 (1999); CATALYST, A NEW APPROACH TO FLEXIBILITY: 
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Inadequate work/life policies also adversely affect recruitment. Recent 
surveys find that most men as well as women indicate a willingness to take 
lower salaries in exchange for more time with their families.99  In a cross-
national study of some 2,500 university students, over half identified 
“attaining a balance between personal life and career” as their primary 
professional goal.100  Young lawyers similarly identify time for personal 
life as one of their key concerns.101  Those concerns are particularly great 
for women with families, who still end up with a disproportionate share of 
domestic tasks.102
By the same token, a wide array of evidence indicates that humane 
hours, alternative work arrangements, and other family-friendly policies are 
cost-effective strategies.  Such initiatives improve recruitment and 
  In a profession in which half the talent pool is now 
female, workplace practices that devalue family values place employers at 
a competitive disadvantage.  A generation of female lawyers who grew up 
expecting equal opportunity in the workplace is increasingly unwilling to 
settle for less, or to give up satisfying personal and family lives to achieve 
it. 
 
MANAGING THE WORK TIME EQUATION 20-21 (1997) [hereinafter CATALYST, NEW 
APPROACH]. 
 99. The Families and Work Institutes National Study of the Changing Workplace, 
involving some 2,800 workers, found that workplace flexibility and family support was the 
second most significant factor in job satisfaction, after job quality.  Nearly two-thirds of all 
workers would reduce their work week by an average of ten hours.  Steven Ginsberg, 
Raising Corporate Profits by Reaching Out to Families, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 1998, at 
CMC; Sue Shellenbarger, Study of U.S. Workers Finds Sharp Rise Since 1992 in Desire to 
Reduce Hours, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 1998, at A10.  For discussion of the generational shift 
in priorities within law and accounting firms as young men as well as women express 
greater desire for time with their families, see FAMILIES & WORK INST., GENERATIONS AND 
GENDER IN THE WORKPLACE (Oct., 2004) [hereinafter FAMILIES & WORK INST., 
GENERATIONS AND GENDER].  See Joan Williams, Canaries in the Mine: Work/Family 
Culture and the Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2230-31 (2002) [hereinafter Williams, Canaries 
in the Mine]; Bruce Baltestier, Mommy Track: No Career Derailment, N.Y.L.J., June 9, 
2000, at 24; Terry Carter, Your Time or Your Money, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2001, at 26.  One 
survey by Harris Interactive and the Radcliffe Public Policy Center found that almost three 
quarters of men in their middle thirties, compared to only a quarter of men over sixty-five, 
would be willing to take lower salaries in exchange for more time available for their family.  
Kirsten Downey Grimsley, Family: A Priority for Young Workers, WASH. POST, May 3, 
2000, at E1. 
 100. Sue Shellenbarger, Work and Family: What Job Candidates Really Want to Know, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 1999, at B1. 
 101. FAMILIES & WORK INST., GENERATIONS AND GENDER, supra note 99, discussed in 
Leigh Jones, Law Firms Mull the ‘Gen Y’ Equation, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 2, 2005, at A1.  See 
Williams & Calvert, Balanced Hours, supra note 94, at 370 (quoting NALP Director Paula 
Patton about preferences of younger lawyers). 
 102. Edmund L. Andrews, Survey Confirms It: Women Outjuggle Men, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
15, 2004, at A22. 
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retention, and help reduce stress and other health-related disorders.103  
Some recent estimates suggest that every dollar invested in these policies 
concerning quality of life results in two dollars saved in other costs.104  
Other surveys find that part-time employees are generally more efficient 
than full-time counterparts, particularly those clocking sweatshop hours, 
and that any additional overhead expenses are more than offset by reduced 
attrition.105
Confronting the Barriers to Balanced Lives 
  In short, balanced lives boost bottom lines. 
If the economic justification for balanced lives is so persuasive, the 
obvious question is why the legal workplace so often fails to permit or 
promote them.  One explanation is that the priority placed on billable hours 
has assumed symbolic as well as economic significance.  Lawyers’ 
willingness to work extended schedules has become a proxy for harder to 
measure qualities such as commitment, ambition, and reliability under 
pressure.106  In an increasingly competitive marketplace, the ability to offer 
client service “24/7” has obvious value, and weeding out those with 
different priorities may seem to make good economic sense.  Moreover, 
partners who advance to decision-making positions typically do so without 
“special accommodation” and often believe that if they managed, so can 
everyone else.107
 
 103. FAMILIES & WORK INST., FEELING OVERWORKED, supra note 
  A pervasive attitude is captured in a New Yorker cartoon 
90, at 7-8, 55. 
 104. Richard Ellsberry, The Family Friendly Office, OFF. SYS., Mar. 1, 1999, at 42; 
Mackenzie Carpenter, A Few Ounces of Prevention, PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE, June 5, 
1998, at A1; Keith Cunningham, Note, Father Time: Flexible Work Arrangements and Law 
Firms’ Failure of the Family, 53 STAN. L. REV. 967, 1004 (2001). 
 105. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 98, at 112; Williams, Canaries in the 
Mine, supra note 99, at 2227; BOSTON BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON WORK-FAMILY 
CHALLENGE, supra note 98, at 25; LOTTE BAILYN, BREAKING THE MOLD: MEN, WOMEN AND 
TIME IN THE NEW CORPORATE WORLD 80-84 (1993); LINDA BRAY CHANOW, WOMEN’S BAR 
ASS’N OF WASHINGTON, D.C., LAWYERS, WORK, AND FAMILY: A STUDY OF ALTERNATIVE 
SCHEDULES AT LAW FIRMS IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 8 (2000); M. DIANE VOGT & LORI-
ANN RICKARD, KEEPING GOOD LAWYERS: BEST PRACTICES TO CREATE CAREER 
SATISFACTION 55 (2000). 
 106. Cynthia Fuchs Epstein & Caroll Seron, The Symbolic Meanings of Professional 
Time, in LEGAL PROFESSIONS: WORK, STRUCTURES AND ORGANIZATION 79-94 (Jerry Van 
Hoy ed., 2001); Renee M. Landers et al., Rat Race Redux: The Adverse Selection in the 
Determination of Work Hours in Law Firms, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 329, 329 (1996); EPSTEIN 
ET AL., THE PART-TIME PARADOX, supra note 87, at 56; BOSTON BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON 
WORK-FAMILY CHALLENGE, supra note 98, at 31; Martha Neil, Lawyers Shun Firms’ Offer 
of Part-Time Work, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Dec 8, 2000, at 22 (quoting Patton). 
 107. As one lawyer put in a study of glass ceilings in the New York bar, “I have a family.  
I didn’t get time off to do that.  Why should you?”  Cynthia Epstein et al., Glass Ceilings 
and Open Doors: Women’s Advancement in the Legal Profession, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 
409 (1995).  For other examples of resistance, see NOSSEL & WESTFALL, supra note 89, at 9, 
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featuring a well-heeled professional advising his younger colleague: “All 
work and no play makes you a valued employee.”108
Reduced hours or alternative schedules evoke resistance on other 
grounds as well.  Some lawyers are annoyed at having to schedule around 
someone else’s personal needs.  Other lawyers resent having to assume a 
disproportionate share of travel, late assignments, or holiday work.  
Backlash is especially likely if employers fail to make fair arrangements for 
reallocation of part-time lawyers’ work, or limit alternative schedules to 
parents.  Attorneys who have no choice about working long hours become 
understandably annoyed when forced to put in additional time because of 
colleagues’ shorter workweek.
 
109
Further problems arise when lawyers on alternative schedules attempt to 
mitigate such resentment by demonstrating “commitment” and consistently 
exceeding their agreed-upon hours. The result of this “schedule creep” is 
that home becomes work, “unexpected emergencies” become expected 
events, and attorneys can end up with close to full-time work for part-time 
pay.
 
110  Such inequities, together with the stigma and isolation that often 
accompany a reduced schedule, discourage the vast majority of lawyers 
from seeking it.  Although about ninety-five percent of law firms have 
policies that allow part-time work, only about four percent of lawyers in 
fact work part-time.111
 
44, 102, 126, 187, 251, 266, 277, 297; Williams & Calvert, Balanced Hours, supra note 
  Between seventy-five and ninety percent of 
surveyed attorneys believe that taking a reduced schedule would jeopardize 
94, 
at 370; Amy Bach, Nolo Contendre, N.Y. MAG., Dec. 11, 1995, at 54; Jim Oliphant, X-ing 
Out Tradition, BROWARD DAILY BUS. REV., Dec. 18, 1998, at 16; Amy Saltzman, Woman 
vs. Woman, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 25, 1996, available at 
http://www.usnews.com/biztech/articles/960325/archive_009948.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 
2005). 
 108. Leo Cullum, cartoon, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 30, 1998, available at 
http://www.cartoonbank.com (last visited Oct. 13, 2005). 
 109. Cynthia L. Cooper, Moms V. Non-Moms: Does Law Firm Culture Widen the Riff?, 
PERSPECTIVES (A.B.A. Comm’n on Women in the Profession, Chicago, Ill.), Win.-Spr. 
2002, at 8-9. 
 110. Rhode, Balanced Lives, supra note 81, at 24; Joan Williams & Cynthia Thomas 
Calvert, Is Your Firm’s Part Time Program a Retention Tool?, LAW PRAC. MGMT., Apr. 
2003, at 33, 34; Williams, Canaries in the Mine, supra note 99, at 2226; WOMEN’S BAR 
ASS’N MASS., supra note 82, at 16; CATALYST, FLEXIBLE WORK ARRANGEMENTS 54 (2000); 
Williams et al., supra note 92, at 416; Giglio, supra note 94, at 33; Sue Shellenbarger, Work 
& Family, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2005, at D1. 
 111. See Marci Alboher Nusbaum, Lawyers Push to Keep the Office at Bay, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 7, 2003, at C13; Dianne Molvig, Balancing Work and Personal Life: Flexible Work 
Options, WIS. LAW., Apr. 2004, at 10, 13; Paula A. Patton, Women Lawyers: Their Status, 
Influence, and Retention in the Legal Profession, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &  L. 173, 180 
(2005). 
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their legal career and prospects for partnership.112
None of these obstacles to alternative work arrangements are 
insurmountable.  Such arrangements can include not only reduced hours, 
but compressed or flexible schedules, and telecommuting.  Contrary to 
widespread perceptions, the research available does not find substantial 
client resistance to these alternatives.
 
113  What clients want is 
responsiveness and continuity.  If a lawyer working a non-traditional 
schedule can address their needs within a reasonable time frame, or ensure 
competent backup assistance from someone else, clients typically have no 
objection.  Indeed, they generally prefer such arrangements to the 
retraining costs associated with high attrition.114  Moreover, full-time 
attorneys working excessive hours do not necessarily provide more 
accessible or efficient service.  As one in-house counsel noted, almost no 
outside attorneys “will be devoted to our case one hundred percent, so why 
should I care what they are doing the rest of their time, whether it is other 
clients’ work or family?  If they are not responsive, I’ll be upset; it doesn’t 
matter why.”115  And as other clients have pointed out, a part-time lawyer 
on a cell phone from a playground may be more accessible than a full time 
lawyer in a deposition for someone else’s case.116
So too, firms can minimize the internal backlash from alternative 
schedules by not limiting their availability to parents, and by designing 
equitable plans for reallocating work.
 
117
 
 112. CATALYST, WOMEN IN LAW: MAKING THE CASE 19 (2001).  See Martha Neil, 
Working 9-5, or 10-3, or 1-4 . . ., A.B.A. J., Dec. 2003 (quoting NALP director about 
partnership perceptions), at http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/1203ca.html (last visited 
Oct. 13, 2005); Jennifer Martin, Part-Time Lawyers Suffer Overwork: Are Perceived as 
Being Less Devoted, BAR LEADER, Sept. 2001, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/barserv/overwork.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2005); Williams & 
Calvert, Balanced Hours, supra note 
  Employers who have taken such 
an approach generally have not found that it “opens the floodgates” to 
94, at 375 (discussing perceptions about partnership 
and advancement); Williams, Canaries in the Mine, supra note 99, at 2225-26 (discussing 
stigma). 
 113. Williams et al., supra note 92, at 445-47 (noting that all but a handful of 
interviewees did not object to such schedules, and many supported them as a way to reduce 
turnover); Williams and Calvert, Balanced Hours, supra note 94, at 372 (noting clients’ 
desire for policies that reduce turnover); Molvig, supra note 111, at 13, 54 (quoting 
managing partner James Sandman regarding client preferences). 
 114. Molvig, supra note 111, at 10, 14; Williams, Canaries in the Mine, supra note 99, at 
2229. 
 115. Williams et al., supra note 92, at 445-46 (quoting unidentified attorney). 
 116. Rhode, Balanced Lives, supra note 81, at 20; see also Williams et al., supra note 92, 
at 445-46. 
 117. Williams et al., supra note 92, at 425-26; Rhode, Balanced Lives, supra note 81, at 
34. 
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arrangements that are unprofitable for the firm or unacceptable to clients.118  
Thousands of organizations, both in law and comparable professional 
settings, function effectively with policies that were once assumed to be 
unworkable and unaffordable.119
IV.  PROFITS AND PRIORITIES 
 
In THE PARADOX OF SUCCESS, John O’Neil notes that monetary success 
brings many rewards, but not necessarily the ability to enjoy them.120  For 
lawyers, the priority on profits may often be self defeating; it can squeeze 
out time for family, friends, public service, and personal interests that 
would ultimately prove more satisfying than the incremental income 
generated by excessive workloads. Particularly in large firms, the ultimate 
achievement, full equity partnership, typically promises no reprieve from 
the punishing schedules that preceded it.  As a hiring partner at Covington 
& Burling once put it, the promotion process is similar to a “pie-eating 
contest where the prize is more pie.”121
Income and Satisfaction 
 
In fact, considerable evidence indicates that such reward structures are 
not the best route to professional satisfaction.  Money plays a much smaller 
role in promoting personal satisfaction than is commonly assumed.  
Americans’ income, controlled for inflation, is twice what it was in the late 
1950s, but fewer report being very happy and more objective evidence 
concerning mental health difficulties also suggests a decline in well-
being.122  Researchers consistently find that for individuals at lawyers’ 
income levels, differences in compensation bear relatively little relationship 
to differences in satisfaction.123
 
 118. Rhode, Balanced Lives, supra note 
  Individuals earning $200,000 are not 
81, at 41. 
 119. Id.; Williams et al., supra note 92, at 378-79. 
 120. JOHN R. O’NEIL, THE PARADOX OF SUCCESS 26-31 (2004). 
 121. Marie Beaudette, Associates Leave Firm in Droves, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 6, 2003, at A1 
(quoting Mark Plotkin).  
 122. GREGG EASTERBROOK, THE PROGRESS PARADOX 164 (2003); BUREAU OF THE 
CENSUS, CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, 2002, available at 
http://govinfo.library.orst.edu/stateis.html/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2005); Schiltz, supra note 
84, at 881-89. 
 123. David G. Myers & Ed Diener, Who is Happy?, 6 PSYCHOL. SCI. 12, 13 (1995); 
JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERSPENT AMERICAN 9 (1998); ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER 
72, 112-113 (1999); Matthew Herper, Money Won’t Buy You Happiness, FORBES, Sept. 21, 
2004, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/technology/sciences/2004/09/21/cx_mh_0921happiness.html (last 
visited Nov. 25, 2005). 
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significantly happier than those earning half that much.124  There is also no 
relationship between compensation and fulfillment across different fields of 
practice.  Discontent is greatest among well-paid large firm associates and 
least pronounced among relatively low-earning academics, public interest, 
and public sector employees.125
One reason for this disconnect between wealth and satisfaction is that 
most of what high incomes can buy does not yield enduring happiness.  
Desires, expectations, and standards of comparison tend to increase as 
rapidly as they are satisfied.  As psychologists note, the transitory pleasure 
that comes through non-essential purchases is less critical in promoting 
well-being than other factors, such as individuals’ relationship with 
families, friends, and communities, and their sense of contributing to larger 
societal ends.
 
126
Self-Defeating Dynamics 
 
Yet several dynamics converge to trap lawyers into choices that 
overvalue income.  One dynamic involves the difficulty of downward 
economic mobility.  Attorneys who initially chose well-paying jobs in 
order to gain training and prestige, or to pay off student loans, often 
become habituated to the lifestyle that such positions make possible.127  So 
too, the work required to generate high income creates a heightened sense 
of deprivation that fuels heightened demands. Attorneys working 
sweatshop hours feel entitled to goods and services that will make their 
lives easier and more pleasurable.  This pattern of compensatory 
consumption can become self-perpetuating.  As one refugee from large 
firm practice notes, lawyers frequently use the “substantial income from 
their jobs in an attempt to fill the voids created by their jobs.”128
 
 124. Robert E. Lane, Does Money Buy Happiness?, 113 PUB. INT. 56, 61, 63 (1993); 
FRANK, supra note 
  Part of 
the reason many professionals accept grueling schedules is to afford 
“extras” for themselves or their families that they have little time to enjoy.  
Yet luxuries can readily become necessities and prevent attorneys from 
123, at 183. 
 125. NALP FOUND. & THE AMERICAN BAR FOUND., supra note 66, at 8, 10; BOSTON BAR 
ASS’N TASK FORCE ON PROF. FULFILLMENT, EXPECTATIONS, REALITY, & RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR CHANGE, Aug. 15, 1997, available at http://www.bostonbar.org/prs/fulfillment.htm. 
 126. MARTIN E. P. SELIGMAN, AUTHENTIC HAPPINESS 9 (2002) (arguing that pleasure is 
less related to enduring happiness than engagement in relationships and a sense of meaning, 
which involves using personal capacities to make a broader societal contribution); Herper, 
supra note 123. 
 127. O’NEIL, supra note 120, at 132; WILLIAM R. KEATES, PROCEED WITH CAUTION 126-
27 (1997). 
 128. KEATES, supra note 127, at 126. 
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opting for a more satisfying balance of personal, professional, and public 
service pursuits. 
A desire for relative status pushes in a similar and equally corrosive 
direction.  For many individuals, including lawyers, money is a key 
measure of achievement and self-esteem, and spending money is a way to 
signal success and social status.  The desire to impress and display is 
deeply rooted in human nature, and in America’s increasingly materialist 
culture, self-worth is linked to net worth.129  Income is, to large extent, a 
“positional good;” individuals’ perceptions of their own pay depends on its 
position relative to others.130  The frequently public nature of personal 
salaries has made the competition for relative status easier to play and 
harder to win.131  As economists note, this kind of arms race has few 
winners and many losers.  There is, in fact, no room at the top.  “Addictive 
ambition” fuels desires not readily satisfied.132
These dynamics skew the priorities not only of individual lawyers but 
also of the firms that employ them.  Because money is at the top of almost 
everyone’s scale, it is easier to reach consensus on maximizing 
compensation than on other values such as reducing hours or subsidizing 
substantial pro bono commitments.  Firms that sacrifice profits for other 
workplace satisfactions risk losing talented rainmakers and recruits who 
prefer greater earnings.  Once high pay scales are established, they are 
difficult to dislodge.  Downward mobility is painful, and the working 
conditions necessary to sustain such incomes then encourage the sense of 
deprivation and entitlement that fuel desires for further financial 
compensation.  Even attorneys who initially entered the profession with 
modest financial aspirations and strong social justice commitments often 
become trapped in these reward cycles.  If these lawyers cannot afford to 
do the kind of public-interest work that they would really like, they want at 
least to be very well paid for what they are doing. 
  Attorneys who look hard 
enough can always find someone getting something more. 
 
 129. For a discussion of the need to impress, see RICHARD CONNIFF, A NATURAL HISTORY 
OF THE RICH 145 (2002). 
 130. Robert H. Frank, How Not to Buy Happiness, DAEDALUS, Spr. 2004, at 69, 79. 
 131. As Steven Brill, the former editor of the AMERICAN LAWYER, has noted, once legal 
periodicals began comparing law firm salaries, “suddenly all it took for a happy partner 
making $250,000 to become a malcontent was to read that at the firm on the next block a 
classmate was pulling down $300,000.”  Steven Brill, “Ruining” the Profession, AM. LAW., 
July-Aug. 1996, at 5. 
 132. ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER TAKE-ALL SOCIETY 41 (1995); 
O’NEIL, supra note 120, at 29-30; KEATES, supra note 127, at 144; SCHOR, supra note 123, 
at 5-12; Mike Papantonio, Legal Egos on the Loose, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1999, at 108. 
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V. STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE 
Changing the culture of law firm practice will require strategies on 
multiple levels. Leaders of firms need to recognize all the ways in which 
ethics pays and ethics counts, and must restructure their policies 
accordingly.  Leaders in the profession need to do more to insure that ethics 
does in fact pay, and to provide rewards and recognition for firms that meet 
best practice standards on issues involving ethics compliance, pro bono 
service, and balanced lives.  And leaders in legal education need to devote 
more attention in their teaching and research to institutionalizing ethical 
values. 
Law Firms 
One consistent finding of research on organizational culture is the 
significance of ethical commitment among those in leadership positions.133  
Leaders set a moral tone and a moral example by their own behavior.134  
Workers take cues about appropriate behavior from those in supervisory 
positions.  Whether employees believe that leaders care about principles as 
much as profits significantly affects the frequency of ethical conduct.135  
Whether leaders actively convey support for pro bono service and balanced 
lives is also critical in institutionalizing those values, and in realizing their 
benefits in recruitment, retention, and productivity.136  Consistency 
between words and practices is particularly important.137
 
 133. PAINE, VALUE SHIFT, supra note 
  Core values need 
to shape day-to-day decisions concerning promotion, compensation, 
5, at 249; Linda Klebe Treviño et al., Managing 
Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works and What Hurts, 41 CAL. MGMT. REV. 131, 142-
43 (1999) [hereinafter Treviño et al., Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance]; Lynn 
Sharpe Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, HARV. BUS. REV., March-Apr. 1994, 
at 106, 113; CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION 
AND DEMOCRACY 50, 94, 203 (2002). 
 134. Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations and 
Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35 
RUTGERS L.J. 1, 10-11 (2003); Chris Moon & Clive Bonny, Attitudes and Approaches, in 
BUSINESS ETHICS 34 (Chris Moon & Clive Bonny eds., 2001); Michael Hoffman, 
Integrating Ethics into Business Cultures, in BUSINESS ETHICS, supra note 134, at 43-44, 51. 
 135. Treviño et al., Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance, supra note 133, at 142; 
Heesun Wee, Corporate Ethics: Right Makes Might, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Apr. 11, 2002 
(describing findings of Ethics Research Center 2000 Survey), 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/apr2002/nf20020411_6350.htm (last visited 
Nov. 25, 2005). 
 136. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE, supra note 57, at 30; Williams, Canaries in the 
Mine, supra note 99, at 2234-35; Williams et al., supra note 92, at 433-36. 
 137. Vicky Arnold et al., Understanding the Factors Underlying Ethical Organizations: 
Enabling Continuous Ethical Improvement, 15 J. APPLIED BUS. RES. 1, 10 (1999); Moon & 
Bonny, supra note 134, at 29-34; Hoffman, supra note 134, at 50. 
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performance evaluation, and billable hour requirements. 
So, for example, to maintain an ethical workplace, firms need effective 
structures for raising and addressing ethical issues, as well as strategies for 
evaluating the adequacy of those structures.  Systematic information is 
necessary concerning the nature and frequency of perceived ethical 
problems and the appropriateness of organizational responses.  Do lawyers 
feel able to raise ethical concerns about clients, colleagues, and supervisors 
without risking adverse personal consequences?  How well does the firm 
follow up on reports of possible misconduct?  These are key factors in 
creating an ethical workplace climate, and too few legal employers have 
made serious attempts to assess them.138
On issues of pro bono contributions, law firms must ensure a closer 
relationship between professed values and daily practices.  In theory, 
virtually all firms support such public service, but only a quarter fully count 
it toward meeting billable hour requirements, and only ten percent of 
surveyed lawyers believe that it is valued the same as paying work.
 
139
 
  The 
inadequacy of current policies suggests obvious directions for reform.  My 
own study identified best practices such as: 
• a formal pro bono policy; 
• visible commitment by the organization’s leadership; 
• credit for pro bono work toward billable hour requirements; 
• consideration of pro bono service as a favorable factor in 
promotion and compensation decisions; 
• recognition and showcasing of service; 
• a pro bono committee or coordinator that matches participants 
with appropriate placements and ensures adequate training, 
supervision, and performance; and 
• compliance with the Law Firm Pro Bono Challenge of three 
percent or five percent of billable hours or the ABA Model 
Rules’ standard of fifty hours per lawyer per year or the 
financial equivalent.140
 
 
In determining what qualifies as “pro bono publico,” firms should 
 
 138. The same is true of business organizations.  See Treviño et al., Managing Ethics and 
Legal Compliance, supra note 133, at 143-48; TREVIÑO & WEAVER, MANAGING ETHICS, 
supra note 16, at 224, 272; Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, supra note 133, at 
113. 
 139. See RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE, supra note 57, at 138, 140, and text 
accompanying notes 68 and 73 supra. 
 140. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE, supra note 57, at 169. 
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include only work that in fact focuses on the public good, not the concerns 
of family, friends, supervising partners, or deadbeat paying clients. 
A comparable range of reforms is necessary on issues involving 
balanced lives.  As noted earlier, excessive hours and inadequate 
alternatives are a widespread problem.  Organizations such as the ABA 
Commission on Women in the Profession, Catalyst, and the Project on 
Attorney Retention at American University College of Law have proposed 
a variety of correctives, such as:  
 
• reasonable billable hour standards that can accommodate 
significant  family, pro bono service, and other personal 
commitments; 
• broad eligibility for alternative schedules, including reduced 
time, flexible hours, compressed workweeks, and 
telecommuting, 
• proportionate compensation and benefits for lawyers on reduced 
schedules; 
• monitoring structures designed to minimize the risks associated 
with alternative schedules, such as poor quality assignments, 
lack of promotion opportunities, and workloads routinely 
exceeding agreed limits.141
 
 
Firms should also seek systematic information about work/life concerns 
from lawyers who are leaving the firm as well as those who remain. 
Clients, Courts, and Bar Associations 
Related strategies should focus on providing more incentives for law 
firms to adopt adequate ethics, pro bono, and work/life initiatives.  For 
example, bar associations could promulgate best practice standards on 
these issues and publicize the firms that comply.  Courts or bar associations 
could also require legal employers to report information on at least some of 
these matters.  After Florida instituted a pro bono reporting requirement, 
lawyers’ volunteer hours and financial contributions grew substantially.142
 
 141. Williams, Canaries in the Mine, supra note 
  
99, at 2234-37; Williams et al., supra 
note 92, at 423-32; Rhode, Balanced Lives, supra note 81, at 23-24; Rhode, Balanced Lives 
for Lawyers, supra note 81, at 2219.  For a general approach to improving performance on 
gender-related issues see CATALYST, MAKING CHANGE: CREATING A BUSINESS-ALIGNED 
DIVERSITY SCORECARD (2005); and ERNST & YOUNG, SUPPORT FOR WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP, 
available at http://www.ey.com/global/Content.nsf/US/About_Ernst_Young_-
_Center_New_Workforce (last visited Nov. 25, 2005). 
 142. Judith L. Maute, Pro Bono Publico in Oklahoma: Time for Change, 53 OKLA. L. 
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Similar progress has resulted from corporate clients’ demand for 
information on racial and ethnic diversity in firms that they are considering 
as outside counsel.143  But few corporate clients, only three percent in one 
recent survey, have required information about the pro bono involvement 
of firms that are seeking legal work.144  Experience in other nations 
suggests that public service contributions would increase if more clients 
considered those contributions in selecting their lawyers.145
Public or private sector organizations that purchase substantial amounts 
of legal services could also make pro bono commitments a condition of 
representation.  For example, in California, some municipalities, as well as 
the state government, include such provisions in contracts for legal services 
that exceed a specified amount.
 
146  Local governments in other nations not 
only consider pro bono efforts, but also require a percentage of the profits 
on their legal work to be used for charitable legal activities.147
More rewards and recognition should also go to firms with effective 
work/life policies.  Pressure from clients would serve their own economic 
interests; they do not get cost-effective services from bleary, burned-out 
lawyers working sweatshop hours.  The challenge remaining is to enable 
and encourage clients, as well as job applicants, to consider work/life issues 
when choosing among law firms.  Publicizing firms’ records concerning 
billable hour quotas and alternative schedules could assist that process. 
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Further incentives for best practices in these areas could come from law 
schools.  They could, for example, require legal employers who use 
campus placement facilities to disclose their pro bono and work/life 
policies, their employees’ annual public service contributions, and the 
usage rates of alternative work schedules.  Such information could also 
become part of national databases, directories, and media ranking 
systems.148  Analogous reporting requirements could also be developed for 
the law schools themselves.  Although ABA accreditation standards require 
schools to provide appropriate pro bono service opportunities, many 
institutions neither keep nor disclose specific information on participation 
rates.  The best available information indicates that most students graduate 
without a law-related pro bono experience.149
Messages about legal ethics, pro bono service, and balanced lives also 
need to be reinforced throughout the law school culture.  Although issues 
of professional responsibility arise in all areas of legal practice, they are 
missing or marginal in most of legal education.  Even less attention focuses 
on pro bono activities.  One of the most dispiriting findings of my recent 
survey was that only one percent of surveyed attorneys recalled any 
discussion of pro bono responsibilities in their law school legal ethics 
courses or orientation programs.
  That record might improve 
if schools were required to disclose information on their student 
involvement as part of the accreditation process, or as a condition for 
membership in the Association of American Law Schools. 
150  Similar gaps occur with respect to 
work/life balance and its importance for the health and well-being of 
practitioners.151  When evaluating career choices, students often have little 
grasp of what current billable hours requirements entail on a continuing 
basis and what other values may fall by the wayside.152
 
 148. The A-List, AM. LAW., Sept. 1, 2005, at 84 (basing list on profitability, diversity, 
associate satisfaction, and pro bono work). 
  All too often, legal 
education is silent on crucial issues facing students about how to structure a 
meaningful professional life.  Correctives are obvious.  Core courses can 
 149. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE, supra note 57, at 24. 
 150. Id. at 162. 
 151. Leading professional responsibility casebooks often provide no coverage of these 
issues.  For exceptions, see DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 
91, at 79-88; GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 1090-
91 (4th ed. 2004). 
 152. For discussion of law students’ ignorance about the actual number of working hours 
needed to meet firm quotas, see generally Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work 
Like a Machine: The Dissonance Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1231 (1991). 
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include discussion of ethical issues and prominent pro bono cases, 
placement offices can showcase firms that comply with best practice 
standards on public service and work/life balance; and the administration 
can highlight these issues in extracurricular programs. 
Law professors’ research agendas reflect comparable omissions.  
Systematic studies of ethical compliance, pro bono practices, and work/life 
initiatives are noticeable for their absence.  On the whole, legal educators 
have done far too little to educate themselves, their students, and their 
practitioner colleagues on crucial questions of professional values.  We 
cannot afford to treat such issues of professional responsibility as someone 
else’s responsibility. 
Sigmund Freud began his classic account of Civilization and its 
Discontents with the observation that: “It is impossible to escape the 
impression that people commonly use false standards of measurement: that 
they seek power, success, and wealth for themselves and admire them in 
others, and that they underestimate what is of true value in life.”153
 
  
Lawyers are no exception.  This symposium is a welcome opportunity to 
redirect our attention to core values and their role in law firm practice.   
 
 153. SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 10 (James Strachey, trans., 
1960). 
